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HERCULES' REPLY TO WAGNER'S BRIEF
Pursuant

to Rule 50, Utah R. App. Proc, Hercules

hereby replies to Wagner's Brief in Opposition to Petition for
Certiorari,
1.

Wagner erroneously claims the trial court dis-

missed its cause of action for Hercules' failure to obtain a payment bond on the basis of the court's legal conclusion that the
mobile office units did not constitute an improvement on the
land.

(Wagner's Brief in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari

("Brief1) at

1).

In reality, the trial court's conclusion

regarding the legal status of the mobile office units was based
upon its factual findings.

Furthermore, the trial court's judg-

ment was also based upon the conclusion that because the Navy
owned the land and Modulaire owned the trailers, Hercules is not
a person subject to the provisions of the Payment Bond Statute.
(R. 624, UK 2-3; 625, 1 5; 628, 1 2).
2.

Wagner

claims

that

the trial

court's

Findings

excluded "undisputed facts which should have been and were in

1

The trial court found the following facts: the office units
(1) were mobile (R. 624, H 3); (2) were in no way fixed to the
ground (R. 626, 11 15); (3) were placed on the Navy's land temporarily and not integrated into, affixed to, annexed to, or
adapted to the Navy's land (R. 627-28, 1 22); and (4) were not
placed on the Navy's land permanently and intentionally by
Hercules (R. 628, 1 23).
Wagner claims that Hercules has mischaracterized the nature
of the trailers by referring to them as "mobile."
(Wagner's
Brief at 8 n.4). The trial court, however, which viewed the evidence, including numerous photographs of the office units, refers
in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the mobility of
the units no less than fifteen times in five pages.
(R.
624-628).
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fact part
based

of

the factual

analysis upon which

its legal conclusions."

the

(Brief at 1 ) .

raised this issue with the trial court.

trial

court

However, Wagner

The court, whose prov-

ince it is to ascertain the facts, conscientiously rejected Wagner's proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, because
they did not comport with the evidence.
3.
contains

Wagner claims that Hercules' Statement of the Case

inaccuracies

and mischaracterizations,

sets forth its own statement of facts.

and

therefore,

(Brief at 2 ) .

Paradoxi-

cally, Wagner's first statement of "fact," i.e., that this action
arises out of Wagner supplying materials for the construction of
office space, is simply a legal conclusion.
leased

mobile office

"construction"
applies

to

the Navy's property

constitutes

requires a legal conclusion because

the statute

contracts

construction. . .
land."

units on

Whether placing the

"exceeding

$2,000

in

amount

for

the

of any building, structure or improvement upon

Utah Code Ann. S 14-2-1 (1986)(emphasis added).

There-

fore, Wagner errs in stating that, as a matter of fact, office
space was constructed.
4.

Wagner

claims

that

the

agreement

between

Space

Building Systems and Modulaire refers to Hercules as the "owner."
(Brief at 3, 1 5 ) .

The terms used

in the subcontract

between

Space Building Systems and Modulaire to refer to Hercules, however, are not determinative of Hercules' legal status
case.

Hercules was not a party to that contract.

in this

Furthermore,

the Navy, not Hercules, owned the land on which the mobile office
units

were

placed,

and

Modulaire,

not

Hercules,
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owned

the

trailers.

Hercules only leased the units.

The serious

legal

issues in this case and the facts which relate to them certainly
should

not be determined by the language of a contract

which

Hercules did not draft and to which it was not a party.
5.

In attempting

to overcome

the

"inadequacies" of

Hercules' Statement of the Case, Wagner sites the affidavit of
its own attorney for a description of the mobile office units.
(Brief at 4, H 10).

The conclusory statements of the attorney

are mere argument and contradict the findings of fact of the
2
trial court.
The trial court heard the evidence at trial and
viewed

numerous photographs

of the trailers and made

findings

based on that evidence.
6.
allows

Wagner

Hercules

to

asserts
use

the

that

the

Navy's

Award/Contract

property

gives

which

Hercules

"wide-ranging use and control" of all the property provided under
the contract.
eral

(Brief at 4, H 11).

Provisions

for

Facilities

An examination of the "GenUse

Contracts"

of

the
3
Award/Contract (R. 270-94), however, reveals just the opposite.

2

For example, Wagner claims "that several units are joined to
form expansive office complexes."
(Brief at 4, II 10). However,
the
trial
court
found
that
"each
unit
is
entirely
self-contained."
(R. 626, K 12). Wagner claims that the office
units rest on a "permanent foundation of cinder block."
(Brief
at 4, H 10). The trial court, however, found that the mobile
office units rest upon cinder block stacks which are placed on
wooden pallets which lay on a gravel foundation. (R. 625, H 11).
3
For example, under the terms of the Award/Contract, none of
the Navy's land may become "a fixture or loose its identity as
personalty by reason of affixation to any realty."
(R. 275,
11 8 ) . Absent prior Navy approval, Hercules can use the property
only in performance of its prime contract with the Navy.
(R.
270, 1 2 ) .
Hercules is required to submit a schedule which
Footnote continued on next page.
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7.
valid

Wagner claims that Hercules failed to identify a

reason

to justify a Writ

However, Hercules

expressly

of Certiorari.

identified

(Brief

three valid

at 5 ) .

reasons for

this Court to issue its Writ: (1) the decision of the Court of
Appeals
decision;

in
4

this

case

conflicts

with

a

prior

Supreme

Court

(2) the Court of Appeals decided an important question

of state law which has not been but should be settled by this
5
Court; and (3) the opinion of the Court of Appeals misapprehends
the Payment Bond and Mechanic's Lien statutes.

Any one of these

reasons, alone, is a valid basis for this Court to issue a Writ
of Certiorari.
8.

Wagner claims that the decision of the Court of

Appeals does not conflict with the Mueller case, arguing that the
test in Mueller for determining whether property is real or personal

small

individual

items rather than to entire buildings or structures."

(Brief at

10).

is

"limited

Mueller

specifically

makes

no

such

to relatively

limitation,

but

does

adopt

a

Footnote continued from previous page.
outlines its plan for maintenance of the property, and the Navy
may order increases or decreases in that schedule at any time.
(R. 273, f 6 ) . The facilities on the Navy's property are subject
to government inspection at all times and places. (R. 274, K 7 ) .
And finally, Hercules is not permitted to construct, alter or
make any fixed improvements to the Navy's buildings or land without the Navy's prior written approval. (R. 284, 1 29).
4

Namely, Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy Ass'nf 657 P.2d
1279 (Utah 1982).
5

Namely, whether the use of the Navy's land and the lease with
Modulaire constitute an attachable real property interest under
the Mechanic's Lien statute.
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tripartite

test

property•

for

distinguishing

between

real

and

personal

To argue, as Wagner does, that the mobile office units

are realty because they are buildings, begs the question.

The

issue is whether the mobile office units are realty or personalty,

and

Mueller

provides

the

test

for

making

that

determination.
9.

Wagner claims that use of the Mueller test would

establish that the units became part of the realty.
7-8).

To the contrary, the trial court

(Brief at

applied the test and

found: (1) the mobile office units were placed on the Navy's land
temporarily and were not integrated into, affixed to, annexed to
or adapted the Navy's land; (2) the Navy's land could be used for
a variety of purposes; and (3) Hercules did not intend to place
the units on the Navy's land permanently.

(R. 627-28, 1U 21-23).

CONCLUSION
For

the

reasons

stated

above

and

in

its

Petition,

Hercules renews its request that this Court issue a Writ or Certiorari and reinstate the District Court's Order and Judgment.

6

The test consists of the following factors: (1) the manner
in which the item is attached or annexed to the realty;
(2) whether the item is adaptable to the particular use of the
realty; and (3) the intention of the annexor to make an item a
permanent part of the realty. Mueller, 657 P.2d at 1283. Given
the first factor of the Mueller test, it is surprising that
Wagner claims that the mobile office units should be regarded as
part of the realty "regardless of the manner in which they are
placed upon the land." (Wagner's Brief at 12).
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DATED th

is 22i.—day

of February, 1991.

ES M. <EfeB6ANTE
MARK S. WEBBER
DAVID M. BENNION
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Respondent
Hercules, Inc.
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On this

day of February, 1991, I hereby certify

that I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, four true and correct copies Of the HERCULES' REPLY TO WAGNER'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR CERTIORARI to the following:
Darrel J. Bostwick
Walstad & Babcock, P.C.
254 West 400 South, #200
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
and further certify that this Petition is presented in good faith
and not for delay.
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